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Abstract. Privacy policies are often defined in terms of permitted messages. In-
stead, in this paper we derive dynamically the permitted messages from static
privacy policies defined in terms of permitted and obligatory knowledge. With
this new approach, we do not have to specify the permissions and prohibitions
of all message combinations explicitly. To specify and reason about such privacy
policies, we extend a multi-modal logic introduced by Cuppens and Demolombe
with update operators modeling the dynamics of both knowledge and privacy
policies. We show also how to determine the obligatory messages, how to ex-
press epistemic norms, and how to check whether a situation is compliant with
respect to a privacy policy. We axiomatize and prove the decidability of our logic.
1 Introduction
Privacy policies are often static and defined as a set of permitted messages, for example
in traditional access control languages [2,8,13,19]. If policies were instead defined in
terms of the permitted and forbidden knowledge of the resulting epistemic state of the
recipient of information, then the permitted messages could be derived by combining
and reasoning on this knowledge. This raises the following research problem studied in
this paper:
How to formally specify and reason about privacy policies in terms of permitted
and forbidden knowledge?
The challenge in this research problem is that the exchange of messages changes
the knowledge, and we therefore need a dynamic language which allows us to reason
about these changes. Moreover, we impose the following requirements on languages for
specifying and reasoning about privacy policies.
We must be able to distinguish between a permission to know and the permission
to send amessage. For example, you may be permitted to know your medical file, while
it may not be permitted that someone not being a doctor sends you your medical file.
How do such distinctions allow for a more fined-grained account of classical problems
of security such as the Chinese wall problem?
We must be able to specify and reason about the order in which messages can be
sent. For example, it may be permitted to send some sensitive information only if a
message has been sent before detailing how to deal with sensitive messages. In many
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cases it is more efficient or natural to specify that a given piece of information may not
be known, than explicitly forbidding the different ways of communicating it.
We must be able to specify obligations in privacy policies. For example, it might
happen that some additional instructions should be sent to the user about the nature of
the previous information he received, or that in case personal information is disclosed
inappropriately, the subject of information should be informed. As [6] notices, privacy
laws actually specify which counter measures should apply in case a situation is not
compliant with a privacy policy.
We must be able to express meta-security policies. These are regulations about how
to access the regulation itself. For instance, in some applications there is a need for
constraints of the form: “agents who play the role r1 are forbidden to know that agents
who play the role r2 are permitted to know p”; these constraints may be fulfilled using
“cover stories” to hide some data [15].
We use modal logic, since both knowledge and obligations (and permissions) are
traditionally and naturally modeled in branches of modal logic called epistemic and
deontic logic respectively. This is no new observation in the area of security: Cuppens
already introduced in 1993 a modal logic for a logical formalization of secrecy [14],
and together with Demolombe he developed a logic for reasoning about confidentiality
[16] and a modal logical framework for security policies [17]. This epistemic deontic
logic is the basis of the formalism we introduce in this paper.
The Cuppens-Demolombe logic already got many things right: it can express epis-
temic norms, i.e. norms regulating what is permitted to know, and can represent viola-
tions, unlike most privacy regulation languages (like [6]). However, despite its strengths,
it is not able to reason about the dynamics of knowledge and privacy policies, and it does
not satisfy the above four requirements. They were ahead of their times, since in 1993
dynamics in modal logic was mainly restricted to propositional dynamic logic for rea-
soning about programs. In fact the dynamics of knowledge was studied mainly in the
AGM paradigm of theory revision [1]. In the meantime, much has changed. Dynamic
epistemic logic has become a standard branch of modal logic, on which textbooks have
been written [27], and which is taught at many universities. Our modal logic extends the
Cuppens-Demolombe logic with dynamic update operators, to model both the dynamics
of knowledge and of privacy policies. As Cuppens and Demolombe, we define privacy
policies in terms of knowledge that the recipient of information is permitted/prohibited
to have. The way we define the dynamics of knowledge then allows us to derive the
policies on messages. With this new dynamic feature, we can not only determine in a
generic way the permitted sequence of messages in a given situation but also determine
which change is needed in order to enforce a (possibly new) privacy policy.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the range of phenomena
under study, and we give a number of examples to provide some intuitions. In Section
3, we introduce our Dynamic Epistemic Deontic Logic (DEDL). We start with the static
part, defining epistemic norms and privacy policies, and we then add dynamics, defining
permitted (and obligatory) messages and enforcements of privacy policies. Finally, in
Section 5, we mention some related works and end with some concluding remarks.
2 Our Scenario of Privacy Regulations
In this paper, we consider a single agent (sender) communicating information from a
knowledge base to another agent (recipient), with the effect that the recipient knows the
information. The sender is subject to privacy regulations which restrict the messages he
can send to the recipient. We illustrate the distinction between norms of transmission
of information and epistemic norms with an example:
Example 1. Consider a sender s, e.g., a web server, which is subject to a privacy reg-
ulation: he should not communicate the address a of a person to the recipient r: we
could write this as a norm of transmission of information, regulating the sending of a
message: ¬Ps(send a), which denotes the permission that the sender sends message
a. Instead, in an epistemic norm perspective, this prohibition can be derived from the
prohibition for the sender that the recipient comes to know the address: Kra. This is
expressed by a deontic operator indexed by the sender and having as content the ideal
knowledgeK ′r of the recipient: ¬PsK ′ra.
This distinction is bridged by modelling sending actions performed by the sender
which update the knowledge of the recipient.
Example 2. The message sending action [send a] expresses that the sender sends to the
recipient the address a. The result of the action is that the recipient knows a:Kra. Since
Kra is not permitted by the epistemic norm ¬PsK ′ra, the sender during his decision
process derives that also the action [send a] is not permitted: ¬Ps(send a). Analo-
gously, all other possible actions leading to the forbidden epistemic state Kra, if any,
are prohibited too. E.g., if the address is composed by street e, number n and town t:
e ∧ n ∧ t ↔ a, then the sequence of messages [send e][send n][send t] leads to the
forbidden epistemic stateKra.
While we need to explicitly model the knowledge of the recipient resulting from
the message, it is not necessary to have an explicit modality for the sender, since we
have only one sender and we adopt his point of view. So a alone means that the sender
knows the address. This explains also why we talk about “knowledge” of the recipient:
the sender never lies, so the result of his actions on the epistemic state of the recipient
is knowledge rather than belief: Kra implies a, i.e., that the sender holds a as true. If
instead we allowed the sender to lie to protect some secrets (as, e.g., [10] do), then the
result of the action of sending messages would be a mere belief of the recipient: the
result of [send a] would be that the recipient believes a, but a - from the point of view
of the sender - would not follow from this.
A logical approach to privacy provides a natural solution to the so-called inference
problem, i.e. how further permissions propagate from permitted information:
Example 3. Assume it is prohibited to know the street where some person lives. Thus,
it must be prohibited to know the address of this person. If e∧n∧ t↔ a, then ¬PsK ′re
implies ¬PsK ′ra. Viceversa, if it is permitted to know the address, then it must be
permitted to know the street. The same kind of reasoning is transferred at the level of
norms of transmission of information: e.g., ¬Ps(send e) implies ¬Ps(send a), if it is
prohibited to send the name of the street, it is prohibited to send the entire address.
Note that to attribute knowledge to the recipient, it is neither necessary to have user
profiles nor to have any uncertainty. This stems from the assumption that the sender
is the only source of information for the recipient from the knowledge base. The only
knowledge that should be considered is the one derived from the past interaction be-
tween the two agents, i.e., the information already disclosed by the sender. Assuming
for simplicity that the sender is rational and sends only information consistent with his
previous communicative acts, there is no need of some kind of belief revision.
When the forbidden state is achieved by a sequence of messages, there is the possi-
bility that each message of the sequence is permitted while the resulting state is prohib-
ited: this is a new kind of the Chinese wall problem.
Example 4. (Website example) Consider the information about websites contacted by
a user (the recipient), which are available on a server (the sender) logfile. The list of
websites for each user is clearly a sensitive information which he would not like to dis-
close. However, knowing which websites have been visited is a valuable information,
for example, for the configuration of a firewall, or to make statistics. Thus it has become
anonym by replacing the names of the users with numbers by means of a hashcode (h).
So even if one knows the list of users one cannot understand who contacted which web-
site. However, from the association between users and numbers and between numbers
and websites the original information can be reconstructed. Therefore the mappings
from the users to the numbers (c) and from the numbers to the websites (e) can be
distributed individually but not altogether since their association would allow to recon-
struct the mapping from the users to the websites they visited (v): c ∧ e→ v.
A solution to enforce this privacy policy could be to forbid the distribution of a
mapping if the other one has been already distributed, using a language like the one
proposed by Barth et al. [6], which is able to express policies about the flow of in-
formation referring to actions already performed. This solution, however, requires two
rules corresponding to the possible permutations of communicative acts. Moreover, this
solution is not general, because there can be further ways of making the forbidden in-
formation available. E.g., by distributing the hash function h used. Expressing a flexible
policy on all the alternative combinations of actions becomes soon unfeasible. More-
over, new ways of computing the forbidden information could be devised later, which
would not be taken into account by the policy.
In this situation we have that it is permitted to know the individual pieces of infor-
mation, but not what is implied by the conjunction of them:
PsK
′
rc, PsK
′
re,¬PsK ′rv.
It states that it is permitted to know the mapping between users and numbers (PsK ′rc),
it is permitted to know the mapping between numbers and websites visited (PsK ′re)
but it is not permitted to know the mapping between users and their websites visited
(¬PsK ′rv). We have the same situation from the point of view of permissions concern-
ing actions: it is permitted to send the messages c and e individually, but not their com-
bination: Ps(send c)∧Ps(send e) but ¬Ps(send (e∧c)) otherwise the epistemic norm
¬PsK ′rv would be violated. This means that after sending one of the two messages, the
other one becomes prohibited: [send e]¬Ps(send c) and [send c] ¬Ps(send e).
The possibility of nesting formulas with epistemic and deontic modalities allows
us to express meta-security, i.e., policies concerning the disclosure of policies, as pro-
posed, e.g., by [10]:
Example 5. Sometimes, informing the recipient about the prohibition to send some in-
formation might lead him to infer something he should not know. For example, if the
recipient asks whether a person is a secret agent (p), replying “I cannot tell this to you”
to the question makes the recipient infer that the person is actually a secret agent, oth-
erwise the answer would have been “no”. To avoid this case, it should be prohibited to
let the recipient know the policy that knowing p is prohibited:
¬PsK ′r¬PsK ′rp
In contrast, if a policy is permitted to be known, it can even be communicated to the re-
cipient: ifPsK ′rPsK ′rp then it is permitted to send the messagePsK ′rp:Ps(send PsK ′rp).
This illustrates also that policies can be the content of messages.
3 Dynamic epistemic deontic logic
The logic for privacy regulation should reason about obligations, permissions, knowl-
edge, and information exchange. To deal with these notions altogether, we first extend
in Section 3.1 the logic of Cuppens and Demolombe [17] to a more expressive and flex-
ible logic. This logic is actually based on the well-known deontic logic of Castan˜eda
(see the appendix for more details). In Section 3.2, we then add dynamics to the picture.
This allows us to have a more fine-grained account of privacy regulations and to solve
the research problems that we mentioned in the introduction.
3.1 ‘Static’ privacy policies
Epistemic Deontic Logic (EDL). Starting from a linguistic analysis, the insight of
Castan˜eda’s well known approach to deontic logic is to acknowledge the grammatical
duality of expressions depending whether they are within or without the scope of de-
ontic operators [11]. We follow this approach and therefore split our language into two
kinds of formulas: circumstances and epistemic practitions. The former cannot be in the
scope of an obligation operator O whereas the latter are always within the scope of a
deontic operatorO. This yields the following language LEDL = LφEDL∪LαEDL whose
formulas are denoted φ∗ in general.
LφEDL : φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | Krφ | Osα
LαEDL : α ::= K ′rφ | ¬α | α ∧ α
where p ranges over Φφ. Formulas of LφEDL are called circumstances and formulas
of LαEDL are called epistemic practitions. Osα reads ‘it is obligatory for the sender
that α’. Psα is an abbreviation for ¬O¬α and reads ‘it is permitted for the sender
that α’. Pure circumstances are circumstances without obligation operators Osα. Krφ
reads ‘the recipient knows that φ’. K ′rφ also reads ‘the recipient knows φ’ but this
knowledge operator is always within the scope of a deontic operator and deals with
the ideal knowledge of the recipient. This language is strictly more expressive than the
language of Cuppens and Demolombe [17], even if the semantics is slightly different.
Definition 1 (Semantics). An EDL-model M is a tuple M = (W,D,Rr, R′r, V ),
where W is a non-empty set of possible worlds, Rr : W → 2W , R′r : W → 2W
and D : W → 2W are accessibility relations onW , D being serial and Ru, R′u being
reflexive.1 V : Φφ → 2W is a valuation. The truth conditions are defined as follows.
M,w |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
M,w |= φ∗ ∧ ψ∗ iff M,w |= φ∗ andM,w |= ψ∗
M,w |= ¬φ∗ iff notM,w |= φ∗
M,w |= Osα iff for all v ∈ D(w),M,v |= α.
M,w |= Krφ iff for all v ∈ Rr(w),M,v |= φ
M,w |= K ′rφ iff for all v ∈ R′r(w),M,v |= φ
M |= φ iff for all w ∈ W ,M,w |= φ. (M,w) is called a pointed EDL-model. If P is
a set of formulas, we writeM,w |= c(P) iffM,w |= φ for all φ ∈ P .
Obviously, one can map epistemic practitions to circumstances. This mapping t :
LαEDL → LφEDL replaces in an epistemic practition α the ideal knowledge operatorsK ′r
by actual knowledge operators Kr. It is needed in order to check whether obligations
are fulfilled: for example Osα∧¬t(α) means that we are in a violation state. Formally,
the mapping function t : LαEDL → LφEDL is defined inductively as follows:
t(¬α) = ¬t(α)
t(α ∧ α′) = t(α) ∧ t(α′)
t(K ′rφ) = Krφ.
Theorem 1 (Soundness, completeness and decidability). The semantics of LEDL is
sound and complete with respect to the logic LEDL axiomatized as follows:
A1 All propositional tautologies based on Φφ
A2 ` Osα→ Psα
A3 ` Kφ→ φ
A4 ` Os(α→ α′)→ (Osα→ Osα′)
A5 ` K(φ→ ψ)→ (Kφ→ Kψ)
R1 If ` α then ` Osα
R2 If ` φ then ` Kφ
R3 If ` φ∗ → ψ∗ and ` φ∗ then ` ψ∗
whereK stands forKr orK ′r. LEDL is also decidable.
Proof. It follows straightforwardly from the Sahlqvist correspondence theorem [9] be-
cause Axioms A2 and A3 are Sahlqvist formulas. To prove decidability, one can show
that LEDL has the finite model property by adapting the selection method [9].
1 An accessibility relation R is reflexive if and only if for all worlds w, w ∈ R(w). An accessi-
bility relation R is serial if R(w) 6= ∅ for all worlds w. See [9] for details.
Privacy policies and compliance in EDL. As discussed by Barth et al. [6] in the
theory of contextual integrity, privacy norms are relevant only in some context, usually
defined by roles played by sender and recipient. This leads us to define the following
notions.
Definition 2 (Epistemic norm and privacy policy). An epistemic norm is a formula
of the form φ → Osα or φ′ → Psα′ where φ, φ′ are pure circumstances and α, α′
are epistemic practitions. A privacy policy P is a consistent set of epistemic norms. We
abusively write φ ∈ P if there is φ → Osα ∈ P , and in that case the corresponding α
is written αφ.
Note that permissions concern the knowledge of the recipient. This fact should not
let the reader think that a privacy policy concerns the behavior of the recipient. Indeed,
the beliefs of the recipient are only modified by actions of the sender, so these policies
regulate the behavior of the sender who might disclose information or not to the recip-
ient depending on wether or not this disclosure is in conflict with the privacy policy.
Privacy policies are imposed to the decision maker (sender) from a hierarchical
superior or set up by himself. They should be enforced in any case. However, this set of
epistemic norms is not necessarily complete. As a result, the sender can perfectly add
other epistemic norms as long as they are consistent with the privacy policy, depending
on the particular situation at stake. This leads us to define the following notions of
open and closed privacy policies. Intuitively, an open privacy policy is a policy where
only the permissions of the security policies hold, everything else being forbidden. A
closed privacy policy is a policy where only the prohibitions of the security policy hold,
everything else being permitted. These definitions are similar with the definitions of
permissive and restrictive approach of Cuppens and Demolombe [17].
Definition 3 (Open and closed privacy policy). Let P be a privacy policy.
– The privacy policy P is open if for allEDL-model (M,w), if E(M,w)∪P 0 Psα,
thenM,w |= ¬Psα.
– The privacy policy P is closed if for all EDL-model (M,w), if E(M,w) ∪ P 0
¬Psα, thenM,w |= Psα.
E(M,w) = {φ ∈ LφEL |M,w |= φ} represents the epistemic state of the recipient.
Note that specifying whether a privacy policy P is closed or open specifies com-
pletely what is permitted and forbidden to know for the recipient in the pointed EDL-
model (M,w). However, in the general case, the privacy policy P does not specify
all the obligations that should hold in a situation (M,w). This leads us to define two
notions of compliance. The first notion of compliance, simply called compliance, just
checks wether the obligations Osαφ strictly following from the privacy policy P given
the epistemic state E(M,w) are fulfilled. The second notion of compliance, called
strong compliance, checks whether all the obligations are fulfilled.
Definition 4 (Compliance). Let (M,w) be a pointed EDL-model and P a privacy
policy.
¬e, c,¬v
R′r
¬e, c,¬v
Rr,R
′
r
Rr,R
′
r
e, c, v w : e, c, v
Rr,R
′
r
e,¬c, v
e, c, v
R′r
e,¬c,¬v
Fig. 1.Website example
– The situation (M,w) is compliant with respect to P ifM,w |= c(P) andM,w |=
φ→ t(αφ) for all φ ∈ P .
– The situation (M,w) is strongly compliant with respect to P ifM,w |= c(P) and
M,w |= Osα→ t(α) for all α ∈ LαEDL.
The following proposition shows that the distinction between compliance and strong
compliance is not relevant for closed privacy policies. It also gives a semantic coun-
terpart to the syntactic notion of strong compliance: an epistemic state (represented by
Rr(w)) is strongly compliant if there exists a corresponding ideal epistemic state (rep-
resented by R′r(v) for some v ∈ D(w)) containing the same information (i.e. RrD-
bisimilar).
Proposition 1. Let (M,w) be a pointed EDL-model and P a privacy policy.
– If P is closed then (M,w) is compliant w.r.t. P if and only if (M,w) is strongly
compliant w.r.t. P .
– The situation (M,w) is strongly compliant w.r.t. P if and only if there exists v ∈
D(w) such that Rr(w) and R′r(v) are RrD-bisimilar2.
Example 6. (Website example continued) Consider Example 4, where we have the
mappings from the users to the numbers (c) and from the numbers to the websites (e),
the related mapping from the users to the websites they visited (v) such that c ∧ e→ v.
The epistemic norm solution is to express the privacy policy P1 as:
P1 = {PsK ′rc, PsK ′re,¬PsK ′rv}
The pointedEDL-model (M,w) of Figure 1 represents semantically a situation which
is compliant with respect to this privacy policy. The accessibility relations Rr and R′r
are indexed byRr andR′r respectively and the accessibility relationD is represented by
dashed arrows. Reflexive arrows are omitted, which means that for all worlds v ∈M we
also have that v ∈ Rr(v), v ∈ R′r(v) and v ∈ D(v). We also have thatM |= c∧e→ v.
2 Two pointed models (M, v) and (M ′, v′) are RrD-bisimilar if there is a relation onW ×W ′
satisfying the base condition for Φφ and the back and forth conditions for Rr and D (see
Blackburn et al. [9] for details). If S is a set of worlds of M and S′ a set of worlds of M ′,
S and S′ are RrD-bisimilar if and only if for all v ∈ S there is v′ ∈ S′ such that (M, v) is
bisimilar to (M ′, v′), and vice versa.
¬e, y
Rr
Rr ¬e,¬y
Rr
w : e, y
Rr
e,¬y
Fig. 2. Spyware example
Example 7. (Spyware example) Consider a situation where the list of websites men-
tioned is e and the fact that websites might contain risky softwares is y. The privacy
policy is expressed by a unique epistemic norm:
P2 = {y ∧Kre→ OsK ′ry}
It states that if the recipient knows a list of websites (Kre) which might contain some
risky softwares (y), then the recipient should know that some of these websites might
contain some risky softwares (OsK ′ry). Note that the condition of this epistemic norm
contains an epistemic formula. In Figure 2 is depicted a situation compliant with this
privacy policy. In this pointed EDL-model (M,w), the accessibility relation Rr is
indexed by Rr and reflexive arrows are omitted, which entails that for all v ∈ M , we
have v ∈ Rr(v) and {v} = R′r(v), {v} = D(v). We do have that the situation is
compliant with respect to the privacy policy P2.
In fact, we can generalize this kind of policies to stronger policies where the sender has
to inform the recipient whether some information has some property or not.
3.2 The dynamic turn
Dynamic Epistemic Deontic Logic (DEDL). We now want to add dynamics to the
picture by means of messages sent to the recipient. The content of these messages can
affect the situation in two ways: either it affects the epistemic realm (represented in
a EDL-model by the relation Rr) or it affects the normative realm (represented in a
EDL-model by the relations R′r and D). This leads us to enrich the language LEDL
with two dynamic operators [send φ] and [prom α], yielding the language LDEDL,
whose formulas are denoted φ∗:
LφDEDL : φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | Krφ | Osα | [send φ]φ | [prom α]φ
LαDEDL : α ::= K ′rφ | ¬α | α ∧ α | [send φ]α | [prom α]α
where p ranges over Φφ.[send ψ]φ reads ‘after the recipient learns ψ, φ holds’, and
[prom α]φ reads ‘after the sender promulgates α, φ holds’. The semantics of these
dynamic operators is inspired by Kooi [20] and defined as follows.
Intuitively, after learning ψ, the recipient restricts his attention to the worlds acces-
sible from the current world which satisfy ψ, unless ψ is not true in this current world.
In that case, the message is just ignored. But this second case actually never occurs
here because we assume that sender only sends truthful messages. Likewise, after the
promulgation of α, the ideal worlds are restricted to the worlds which satisfy α, unless
the imperative α is not permitted.
Definition 5 (Semantics). LetM = (W,D,Rr, R′r, V ) be anEDL-model,ψ ∈ LφEDL
and α ∈ LαEDL. We define the EDL-modelsM ∗ ψ andM ∗ α as follows.
– M ∗ ψ = (W,D,R∗r , R′r, V ) where for all w ∈W ,
R∗r(w) =
{
Rr(w) ∩ ||ψ|| ifM,w |= ψ
Rr(w) otherwise.
– M ∗ α = (W,D∗, Rr, R′r, V ) where for all w ∈W ,
D∗(w) =
{
D(w) ∩ ||α|| ifM,w |= Psα
D(w) otherwise.
where ||φ∗|| = {v ∈M |M,v |= φ∗}. The truth conditions are defined as follows.
M,w |= [send ψ]φ∗ iff M ∗ ψ,w |= φ∗
M,w |= [prom α]φ∗ iff M ∗ α,w |= φ∗.
Theorem 2 (Soundness, completeness and decidability). The semantics of LDEDL
is sound and complete with respect to the logic LDEDL axiomatized as follows:
LEDL All the axiom schemes and inference rules of LEDL
A6 ` [send ψ]Krφ↔ (ψ → Kr (ψ → [send ψ]φ)) ∧ (¬ψ → Kr[send ψ]φ)
A7 ` [send ψ]K ′rφ↔ K ′r[send ψ]φ
A8 ` [send ψ]Osα↔ Os[send ψ]α
A9 ` [prom α]Krφ↔ Kr[prom α]φ
A10 ` [prom α]K ′rφ↔ K ′r[prom α]φ
A11 ` [prom α]Osα′ ↔ (Psα→ Os(α→ [prom α]α′))
∧ (¬Psα→ Os[prom α]α′)
A12 ` 2p↔ p
A13 ` 2¬φ∗ ↔ ¬2φ∗
A14 ` 2(φ∗ → ψ∗)→ (2φ∗ → 2ψ∗)
R4 If ` φ∗ then ` 2φ∗
where 2 stands for [send ψ] or [prom ψ]. LDEDL is also decidable.
Proof. We first prove a lemma.
Lemma 1. For all φ ∈ LφDEDL there is φ′ ∈ LφEDL such that ` φ ↔ φ′. For all
α ∈ LαDEDL there is α′ ∈ LαEDL such that ` α↔ α′.
Proof (Lemma). First, note that if ψ is a formula without dynamic operator then one
shows by induction on ψ using A6 to A14 that2ψ is provably equivalent to a formula ψ′
without dynamic operator. Now if φ is an arbitrary formula with n dynamic operators,
it has a subformula of the form 2ψ where ψ is without dynamic operators which is
equivalent to a formula ψ′ without dynamic operators. So we just substitute 2ψ by ψ′
in φ and we get a provably equivalent formula thanks to A14 andR4 with n−1 dynamic
operators. We then iterate the process.
As usual in dynamic epistemic logic, we use the previous key lemma to prove the the-
orem. The soundness part is routine. Let φ ∈ LDEDL such that ` φ. Then there is
φ′ ∈ LEDL such that ` φ ↔ φ′ by Lemma 1, and therefore |= φ ↔ φ′ by soundness.
But |= φ′ by Theorem 1, so |= φ as well. Decidability is proved similarly.
For example, we have the following theorem: ` ψ → [send ψ]Krψ for all propo-
sitional formula ψ, i.e. after the sender sends any truthful message to the recipient, the
recipient knows this message.
Permitted and obligatorymessages. Obviously, given a privacy policy and a situation,
some messages might not be permitted by the privacy policy because they might lead
to a non-compliant situation.
Definition 6 (Permitted and obligatory message). Let φ ∈ LφDEDL, P be a privacy
policy and (M,w) an EDL-model representing a given situation.
– It is permitted for the sender to send message φ according to P in (M,w), written
M,w |= Ps(send φ), if (M ∗ φ,w) is compliant with respect to P .
– It is obligatory for the sender to send message φ according to P in (M,w), written
M,w |= Os(send φ), ifM,w |= OsK ′rφ ∧ ¬Krφ ∧ Ps(send φ).
Note also that if it is obligatory to send a message in a situation then this situation is not
strongly compliant.
Example 8. (Website example continued) In Example 6, we have:
M,w |= Ps(send c) ∧ Ps(send e).
So it is permitted to send the mappings from the users to the numbers (c) and it is
permitted to send the mapping from the numbers to the web-sites (e). However, we also
have
M,w |= [send e]¬Ps(send c) andM,w |= [send c]¬Ps(send e)
which means that after sending the mapping from the numbers to the web-sites (e) it is
not permitted to send the mapping from the users to the numbers (c), and vice versa for
the second conjunct. This is because in both cases we would violate the epistemic norm
¬PsK ′rv:
M,w |= [send e][send c](Krv ∧ ¬PsK ′rv) and
M,w |= [send c][send e](Krv ∧ ¬PsK ′rv).
We also have
M,w |= ¬Ps(send (e ∧ c)).
Our approach is very flexible because it is applicable in infinitely many other con-
texts than the one of the above example, once the privacy policy is fixed. For example,
assume that the hash function computing the mapping from users to numbers is now
w : e, y
Rr
e,¬y
Fig. 3. Spyware example updated
available (h) and that the recipient is able to apply it to get the mapping from numbers
to users (c):
M |= h→ c.
Applying the same reasoning, we would get:
M,w |= [send e]¬Ps(send h)
M,w |= ¬Ps(send (e ∧ h))
and so without having to introduce explicitly new prohibitions or permissions on h.
Privacy policies do not only concern which information can be disclosed but also
which information should be disclosed. We can express such policies due to the fact
that our epistemic deontic logic can express obligations about knowledge, unlike the
one of Cuppens and Demolombe:
Example 9. (Spyware Example continued) After sending the message e in the previous
situation represented by the pointed EDL-model (M,w) of Figure 2 we obtain the
pointedEDL-model (M ∗e, w) depicted in Figure 3. The corresponding situation (M ∗
e, w) is not compliant with respect to P ′. Therefore, it was forbidden to disclose e:
M,w |= ¬Ps(send e)
But it is now obligatory (with respect to P ′) to disclose y:
M ∗ e, w |= Os(send y)
So we have that
M,w |= [send e]Os(send y)
M,w |= ¬Ps(send e) ∧ Ps(send (e ∧ y)).
As it turns out, after sending the message y we reach a compliant situation.
The above example suggests that even if it is prohibited to send message e, it might
still be permitted to send message e as long as it is followed by another message y. We
leave the investigation of the permissibility of iterative messages for future work.
In privacy regulations, the permission to disclose the names of users also allows to
disclose their family names (which are part of their name). This problem, discussed in
Example 3, is known as the inference problem, and is in general difficult to model (see
for instance Barth et al. [6]). In our logical framework it follows easily from the fact that
the recipient has reasoning capabilities. Indeed, if we assume that the conditions of the
epistemic norms of the privacy policy P are propositional then for all φ, φ′ ∈ LφDEDL,
φ→ φ′ |=g Ps(send φ)→ Ps(send φ′)
where |=g is the global consequence relation (see [9] for details).
Example 10. (Website example continued) Assume we have a situation modeled by an
EDL-model M such that M |= v → v′: the association between the users’ name
and the web-sites they visited (v) induces the association between the users’ family
name and the web-sites they visited (v′). So if M,w |= Ps(send v) then M,w |=
Ps(send v
′): if it is permitted to disclose the name of the users in association with the
websites they visited, it is also permitted to disclose their family name in association
with the websites they visited. Dually, if M |= v → v′, then M,w |= ¬Ps(send v′)
implies M,w |= ¬Ps(send v): if it is prohibited to disclose their family names in
association with the web-sites they visited then it is also prohibited to disclose their
names in association with the web-sites they visited.
We have another interesting property connecting the notions of permitted and oblig-
atory communicative acts. Let φ, φ′ ∈ LφDEDL:
If ` φ′ → φ then ` Os(send φ′)→ ¬Ps(send ¬φ)
This proposition states that if it is obligatory to disclose a fact then it is prohibited to
disclose the opposite of any of its logical consequences. However, note thatOs(send φ)
and Ps(send φ) are not dual operators:
0 Os(send φ)↔ ¬Ps(send ¬φ).
This is intuitively correct: in Example 9 it is prohibited to disclose e but it does not
entail that it is obligatory to disclose ¬e. Moreover, we have the following property:
0 Ps(send φ) ∧ Ps(send ψ)→ Ps(send (φ ∧ ψ)).
Indeed, in Example 8 we hadM,w |= Ps(send e) ∧ Ps(send c) ∧ ¬Ps(send (e ∧ c)).
Enforcing privacy policies: [prom φ]. The hierarchical superior of the sender or the
sender himself might decide to change the policy privacy from P to P ′. As a result, the
sender needs to enforce this new privacy policy P ′. This enforcement is captured in our
formalism by [prom ψ].
Example 11. (Website Example) In case of attack by some hacker, the privacy policies
can be made more strict. For example, the sender can decide to strengthen the privacy
policy P1 of Example 6 to
P4 = {PsK ′rc,¬PsK ′re,¬PsK ′rv}
where PsK ′re has been replaced by ¬PsK ′re: it is now prohibited to disclose the map-
ping from numbers to visited websites. This new privacy policy P4 can be enforced by
the sender through the update [prom ¬K ′re]. We get the EDL-model (M ∗ ¬K ′re, w)
depicted in Figure 4 which is compliant with respect to P4.
¬e, c, v
R′r
¬e, c,¬v
Rr,R
′
r
Rr,R
′
r
e, c, v w : e, c, v
Rr,R
′
r
e, c, v
Fig. 4.Website example updated
4 Checking compliance and changing policies
The general language LDEDL we defined is not completely appropriate for a security
monitor (the sender) to reason about a situation given a privacy policy. Indeed, it does
not allow him to express that the situation is compliant or not with respect to the privacy
policy. It does not allow him to express that there is a change of privacy policy and that
the new privacy policy is now P ′. It does not allow him to plan actions so that the new
privacy policy is enforced. It does not allow him to express that the current privacy pol-
icy is P and that under this privacy policy he is permitted to disclose φ. These kinds of
statements are needed if we want the decision maker to be able to enforce and maintain
a privacy policy. So we need to define a new language based on LDEDL more appropri-
ate in the context of privacy regulation. This language should allow the decision maker
to refer explicitly to the current privacy policy which was always implicitly present in
the previous language. So we propose the following language LPL whose formulas are
denoted φ∗:
LφPL : φ ::= p | P | c | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | Krφ | Osα | Ps(send φ) |
[send φ]φ | [learns P]φ | [prom α]φ
LαPL : α ::= K ′rφ | ¬α | α ∧ α |
[send φ]α | [learns P]α | [prom α]α
where p ranges over Φφ and P over the set of privacy policies Pol. We assume here
that the set of privacy policies Pol is finite and that each of them has a finite number of
epistemic norms.
So we have five new kinds of formulas referring each of them directly or indirectly
to privacy policies: P , [learns P]φ, Ps(send ψ) and c. P reads ‘the privacy policy is
P’. [learns P]φ reads ‘after sender learns that the new privacy policy is P , φ holds’.
Ps(send φ) reads ‘sending the message φ is permitted’. c reads ‘the situation is compli-
ant w.r.t. P’. This language allows to express all the new kinds of statement we wanted
to express above. For example,P∧¬cmeans that the current privacy policy is P but the
current situation is not compliant with this privacy policy. The formula ¬c ∧ [send φ]c
means that the current situation is not compliant with respect to the privacy policy but
if φ is disclosed then the situation becomes compliant with this privacy policy. The
formula P ∧ ¬c(P) means that the privacy policy is P but this privacy policy is not
enforced.
The semantics for this language is a bit different from the semantics of LDEDL
because we have to refer explicitly in the language to privacy policies. Intuitively,
{(M,w),P} in the definition below is the situation (M,w) where the privacy policy P
holds.
Definition 7. A (pointed) privacy model, is a pair {M,P} (resp. {(M,w),P}) com-
posed of an EDL-modelM (resp. (M,w)) together with a privacy policy P . The truth
conditions are defined inductively as follows:
{(M,w),P} |= p iff M,w |= p
{(M,w),P} |= P ′ iff |= c(P)↔ c(P ′)
{(M,w),P} |= c iff M,w |= c(P)∧∧
φ∈P
(φ→ t(αφ))
{(M,w),P} |= Ps(send φ) iff {(M,w),P}
|= [send φ]c
{(M,w),P} |= [learns P ′]φ iff {(M,w),P ′} |= φ
{(M,w),P} |= [send φ]φ∗ iff {(M ∗ φ,w),P}
|= φ∗
{(M,w),P} |= [prom α]φ∗ iff {(M ∗ α,w),P}
|= φ∗
The other inductive steps are like in Definitions 1 and 8 except that M,w has to be
replaced here by {(M,w),P}.
In the fourth truth condition, there is not necessarily a logical relation betweenP andP ′
since the privacy policy can change for any reason. The second truth condition entails
that we do not distinguish privacy policies if they are compliant in exactly the same
situations.
Theorem 3. The semantics of LPL is sound and complete with respect to the (privacy)
logic PL axiomatized by the following axiom schemes and inference rules. PL is also
decidable.
LDEDL All the axioms schemes and inference rules of
LDEDL
P0 ` c
∧
P∈Pol
(
P →
(
c(P) ∧ ∧
φ∈P
(φ→ t(αφ))
))
P1 ` P ↔ P ′ iff ` c(P)↔ c(P ′)
P2 ` Ps(send φ)↔ [send φ]c
P3 ` [send φ]P ↔ P
P4 ` [prom φ]P ↔ P
P5 ` [learns P]p↔ p
P6 ` [learns P]P
P7 ` [learns P]¬φ↔ ¬[learns P]φ
P8 ` [learns P]Krφ↔ Kr[learns P]φ
P9 ` [learns P]Osα↔ Os[learns P]α
P10 ` [learns P]K ′rφ↔ K ′r[learns P]φ
P11 ` [learns P](φ→ φ′)
→ ([learns P]φ→ [learns P]φ′)
RP If ` φ∗ then ` [learns P]φ∗
Proof (Proof sketch). We use the same method as for the proof of Theorem ??. P2 to
P11 and RP allow to reduce a formula of LPL to a formula of LPL without dynamic
operators. We build the canonical model for this restricted language completely simi-
larly to the canonical modelM of Theorem 1 and we setM,Γ |= P if P ∈ Γ . P1 then
ensures that Condition (2) of Definition 7 is fulfilled. Decidability is proved using the
same method as for the proof of Theorem ??.
Example 12. The mechanisms involved in the website example can be better analysed
and understood with this new language. In Example 6, the privacy policy is P1 and the
initial situation is compliant w.r.t. this privacy policy:
{(M,w),P1} |= c ∧ P1.
After the sender learns that the new privacy policy is P4, the situation is no longer
compliant with this new privacy policy because the privacy policy P4 is not enforced
anymore:
{(M,w),P1} |= [learns P4] (¬c ∧ (P4 ∧ c(¬P4))) .
In that case, we reach a non-compliant situation {(M,w),P4} because we have {(M,w),P4} |=
P4∧¬c(P4). Therefore, sender now has to enforce this new privacy policyP4 by means
of a promulgation. He does so by promulgating the norm ¬K ′re. That was the process
described in Example ??:
{(M,w),P4} |= ¬c ∧ [prom ¬K ′re]c.
We see in the above example that the language LPL really allows the security monitor
to reason about which actions he can perform so that a new privacy policy be enforced
or so that the situation be compliant w.r.t. the privacy policy.
5 Conclusion
Related work. Languages for access control in security have been used for modelling
privacy regulations too [8]. However, they are not easily adapted to the new task, for ex-
ample, because they do not provide ways of reasoning about the information and about
effects of messages. Moreover, they rarely consider the context of communication.
Specific languages for privacy policies have been proposed, but have some limi-
tations. Extensible Access Control Markup Language XACML’s policies can lead to
obligations, but “obligation” is just an uninterpreted symbol which receives meaning at
the point of policy enforcement [2]. Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language EPAL’s
policies are concerned with a single sender (the enterprise itself) and a single recipient
role, like in our model [19]. EPAL structures obligations with a subsumption relation
rather than allowing to reason about knowledge like us. The Platform for Privacy Pref-
erences (P3P) language contains only positive norms and very restricted temporal con-
ditions [13].
Cuppens and Demolombe [16] extends the original framework [14] by using an
epistemic deontic logic to model security in databases. They do not introduce dynamics
in their system, neither for knowledge nor for deontic operators, even if they recog-
nize the importance of this aspect. We share many properties of their epistemic-deontic
modalities, but we also extend them to permissions and obligations concerning actions
and not only propositions, getting a more fine grained analysis, for example of the
Chinese wall problem. Moreover, they do not introduce separately the epistemic and
deontic operators but only combined ones, like [10] do, limiting the expressivity of the
logic. Our modularity allows us to model more complex formulas which can express
meta-security policies or obligations to know whether something holds. Given that our
approach is based on their approach, their solutions to several problems can naturally
be transferred in our setting. They show for example that multi-level security policies
which assign a degree of clearance l to formulae φ and which might be incomplete can
be expressed in their framework by indexing the modality PsK ′rφ with the degree of
clearance l: PsK ′rlφ reads ‘an agent r cleared at level l is explicitly permitted to know
that the database believes φ’. They also avoid possible conflicts between roles and reg-
ulations by defining the role of an agent as an index i of the modality PsK ′riφ and by
introducing an external structure on these roles.
Bonatti et al. [10] use a similar logical framework for reasoning about security in
database access: they explicitly model the beliefs of the user of the database and the
actions which change these beliefs. However, they do not make an explicit distinction
between epistemic and deontic modalities, with resulting limitations such as the impos-
sibility to model permissions and obligations about actions. Moreover, the belief change
mechanism is superimposed to Kripke semantics, while we use a general epistemic dy-
namic logic approach and we are also able to change permissions and obligations and
not only beliefs. As they do, by distinguishing the point of view of the database (sender)
from the beliefs of the user (recipient), we could model situations where the sender of
information is lying, even if this possibility seems less useful in the context of privacy
regulations. Finally, we can model meta-security in our framework, as proposed by the
authors, to specify that it is prohibited to know the privacy policy. Differently from
their work, we can provide also a semantics to meta-security since we allow nestings of
epistemic and deontic modalities.
Barth et al. [6] propose a formalization of the theory of privacy called contextual
integrity. They introduce positive and negative norms, depending on whether they refer
to actions that are allowed or disallowed. Temporal conditions are modelled by means
of linear temporal logic with past and future operators to express, for example, that cer-
tain information may be disclosed only if the subject mentioned has previously given
permission or that if certain information is made public, notification must be sent to
the concerned party. These norms are interpreted in a model of agents who respect
the norms if the trace history of their communication satisfies a temporal formula con-
structed from the norms by taking the disjunction over positive norms and the con-
junction over negative norms. Their language constitute an advancement with respect
to other policy languages, both for the temporal aspect and for including a relation en-
abling agents to combine messages to compute additional information about the subject,
(e.g., computing postal code from postal address), elucidating the notion of a “data hier-
archy” found in P3P and EPAL. However, their privacy policies cannot be changed. On
the other hand, we do not consider the temporal aspect yet: to incorporate this aspect in
our model it might be necessary to resort to an epistemic temporal logic, as in Pacuit
and Parikh [26]. However, in [26], only particular epistemic norms called knowledge-
based obligations of the form Krφ → Osψ, where ψ does not contain any knowledge
operator, can be expressed.
A problem of Barth et al. [6] is the obscurity of the formalism used to model legal
norms, which in turn present ambiguities and difficulties. To cope with this problem
[21] propose a more readable formalism based on logic programming. Our modal logic
aims at improving readability too, but at the same time it allows to study precisely the
properties of the deontic operators.
Logic or logic programming (see also [5]) are not the only methodologies to for-
malize privacy regulations. A recent example is [22] where they use an extension of
access control matrix operations to include operations for notification and logging and
constructs that ease the mapping between legal and formal language. They apply their
methodology to HIPAA regulations of health insurance. [25] proposes to use π-calculus
for privacy in the context of service oriented architectures.
A further issue in privacy is the interaction between policies and the organizations
which have to enforce them. This is addressed, e.g., by [7] and [18]. Our plan to address
this problem is to extend the modal language to a multi-agent language in order to
express obligations, beliefs, knowledge and goals of the different parties involved.
In dynamic epistemic logic, [4] is the closest work to ours. They focus in a multi-
agent setting on the notion of permission to announce. They provide a sound, complete
and decidable logic by enriching public announcement logic with the operator P (ψ, φ)
which reads ‘after ψ has been publicly announced, it is permitted to say φ’. There is no
real notion of privacy policy nor compliance, although the specification of such a policy
could be somehow derived via the specification of their operator P (ψ, φ) (whose first
argument handles the dynamic character of the situations they consider). But as in all
the other approaches mentioned, the (implicit) privacy policy is specified directly on the
announcements/actions and the epistemic character of the situations they consider does
not really play a role. Finally, in their logic, privacy policies cannot change and they do
not have a notion of obligatory announcement or enforcement (although such issues are
addressed independently at the end of their paper).
Concluding remarks. In this paper, we introduced a logic satisfying the four require-
ments of the introduction. In order to use this logic in real situations, the security mon-
itor (sender) would need to implement an EDL-model representing the current epis-
temic/deontic state of affairs. He could then check compliance w.r.t. a given policy and
determine which actions can and should be done by model checking this EDL-model.
A topic for further research is to deal with multi-agent scenarios involving more
agents than just a sender and a recipient, each agent having its own privacy policy.
Another topic for further research is to enrich the dynamics to allow not only operations
which add new regulations but also operations which remove or revise regulations.
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A An extension of Castan˜eda’s deontic logic
In this appendix, we give an extension of our epistemic deontic logic which embeds
Castan˜eda’s deontic logic. Starting from a linguistic analysis, the insight of Castan˜eda
is to acknowledge the grammatical duality of expressions depending on whether they
are within or without the scope of an obligation operator. This leads him formally to in-
troduce two sets of formulas: circumstances which cannot alone be the foci of deontic
operators, unlike what he calls practitions. The former are usually expressed grammat-
ically in the indicative form and the latter are usually expressed grammatically in the
infinitive/subjunctive form. For example, “Freud cures Anna O” in the indicative form
is a circumstance, but the same sentence in “it is obligatory that Freud cures Anna O”
in subjunctive/infinitive form is a practition. Just as practitions are the foci of deontic
operators, circumstances are dually the foci of knowledge operators, as pointed out by
Castan˜eda [12]. Note that an expression φ in the scope of a knowledge operatorKrφ is
always in the indicative form and never in the subjunctive/infinitive form, even if Krφ
is in the scope of a deontic operator O.
We extend Castan˜eda [12]’s intuition to the context of epistemic permissions and
obligations. In a deontic setting the reading of the term knowledge or belief can be
twofold: either as a circumstance or as a practition. On the one hand, in the sentence
“it is obligatory that John knows / for John to know that there is an infinity of prime
numbers” the verb ‘to know’ is the focus of a deontic operator and is in the subjunc-
tive/infinitive form. On the other hand, the sentence “John knows that there is an infinity
of prime numbers” alone describes a circumstance and the interpretation of the verb ‘to
know’ in the indicative form matches the one usually studied in epistemic logic. The
former use of the term knowledge within the scope of a deontic operator is not studied in
epistemic logic. For these reasons we enrich the language of Castan˜eda with two knowl-
edge modalities, one for circumstances and the other one for epistemic practitions. This
yields the following language L′EDL = Lφ
′
EDL ∪ Lα
′
EDL:
Lφ′EDL : φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | Krφ | Osα
Lα′EDL : α ::= β | K ′rφ | ¬α | α ∧ α | α ∧ φ | φ ∧ α
where p ranges over Φφ and β over Φα. The only difference with the language LEDL is
that we now have pure practitions Φα and that practitions can now be of the form φ∧α
or φ→ α where φ is a proposition. Pure practitions Φα are expressions in the scope of
a deontic operator that cannot be expressed with a knowledge operator, such as ‘to cure
Anna O’ in ‘it is obligatory to cure Anna O’. Therefore, just as epistemic practitions,
they are in the subjunctive/infinitive form. Moreover, with this definition of practitions
we can also express formulas of the form Os(φ → α). Obviously, we would like to
have the following validity:
|= Os(φ→ α)↔ (φ→ Osα)
which is a generalization to the epistemic case of Castan˜eda’s key validity. For example,
“it is obligatory that if Freud knows that Anna O is sick, then he cures her” (Os(Krφ→
α)) is intuitively equivalent to “if Freud knows that Anna O is sick, then it is obligatory
that he cures her” (Krφ → Osα). To obtain this validity, we need to add an extra
condition (∗) in our definition of EDL-model and so define EDL-model’.
Definition 8. An EDL-model’ M is a tuple M = (W,D,Rr, R′r, V ), where W is a
non-empty set of possible worlds, Rr, R′r and D are accessibility relations on W , D
being serial, and V is a valuation such that:
for all w ∈W , all v, v′ ∈ D(w) ∪ {w}, (M,v) is RrD-bisimilar to (M,v′). (∗)
The semantic condition (∗) intuitively means that the (epistemic) context where a nor-
mative system applies is fixed. One can easily show that any Castan˜eda model [11] can
be embedded into anEDL-model’, in the sense that the Castan˜eda model and the corre-
spondingEDL-model’ satisfy the same formulas of L′EDL without epistemic operators
Kr or K
′
r. One can also show that the semantics of L′EDL is sound and complete with
respect to the logic LEDL to which we add the axiom scheme ` Os(φ → α) ↔ (φ →
Osα). In this new decidable logic, we can then derive the theorem ` OsK ′rφ→ φ.
